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APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2) and pursuant
to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Issue

Is it in the interests of justice to waive the one-year statute of limitations for post-conviction
relief where the Court announces a new rule, that failure to advise an alien defendant of the
deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an "aggravated felony" constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel, and where this new rule should be retroactively applied to Sergio's case?
1.

Preserved in Trial Court

Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Motion to Dismiss (September 17,2004), pgs. 17-18:
'The Court: But if he says, 'I don't know.' That's not a misrepresentation.
Mr. Lundell: Well actually—I see your point there your Honor an 'I don't know' is not a
misrepresentation but at that point in time there's an affirmative duty for him to provide the client—
The Court: Okay, if that's the rule that if a client asks that it's ineffective assistance of
Counsel not to provide the information, you've got to give me authority for that. It's got to be in
Rojas-Martinez."
2.

Standard of Review

'We review an appeal from an order dismissing or denying a petition for post-conviction
relief for correctness without deference to the lower court's conclusions of law." Gardner v.
Galetka, 2004 UT 42,17,94 P.3d 263.
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B.

Issue

Is it in the interests of justice to waive the one-year statute of limitations for post-conviction
relief where Rojas-Martinez announces a new rule that should be retroactively applied to Sergio's
case?
1.

Standard of Review

"We review an appeal from an order dismissing or denying a petition for post-conviction
relief for conectness without deference to the lower court's conclusions of law." Gardner v.
Galetka, 2004 UT 42,17,94 P.3d 263.
C.

Issue

Is it in the interests of justice to waive the one-year statute of limitations for post-conviction
relief where Sergio raises meritorious claims that should be resolved on the merits?
1.

Standard of Review

'We review an appeal from an order dismissing or denying a petition for post-conviction
relief for correctness without deference to the lower court's conclusions of law." Gardner v.
Galetka, 2004 UT 42,17,94 P.3d 263.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. CONST, amend VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right..
. to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-35a-107:

"(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the cause of
action has accured
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(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a petitioner's failure to
file within the time limitations."
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-35a-104(2):

"(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule announced by the United
States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of Appeals after the petitioner's
conviction becamefinalshall be governed by applicable state and federal principles of
retroactivity."
RULES PROVISION
There are no court rules at issue in this case.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF CASE
Petitioner filed a Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department, State of Utah, dismissed the Verified Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief as untimely under the one-year statute of limitations for post-conviction
relief provided in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107. Petitioner argued that the statute of limitations
should be waived as two new rules should retroactively apply to his case: (1) that failure of counsel
to advise an alien defendant of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an "aggravated
felony" constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) that counsel's affirmative misadvice of
the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an "aggravated felony" constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel.
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a final order of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
Salt Lake Department, State of Utah, dismissing a petition for post-conviction relief as untimely
3

with prejudice.
C. DISPOSITION AT DISTRICT COURT
The District Court found that it would not be in the interests of justice to waive the one-year
statute of limitations provided for in the Post-Conviction Remedies Act because the District Court
held that petitioner was not furnished ineffective assistance of counsel based upon the affidavits
included in the Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The District Court held that failure of
counsel to advise an alien defendant of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an
"aggravated felony" did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The District Court held that
under the facts of petitioner's case he was not affirmatively misadvised of the deportation
consequences of pleading guilty to an "aggravated felony."
RELEVANT FACTS
1.

Sergio Llamas Rodriguez ("Sergio") entered the United States of America

("United States") in or around 1987. See Record, pg. 32.
2.

Prior to Sergio's deportation from the United States in 2000, he lived in the

United States for a total of thirteen years and was a Lawful Permanent Resident of the United
States. See Record, pg. 32.
3.

Prior to Sergio's deportation from the United States in 2000, he had worked at

Albertson's North Salt Lake Distribution Center for the previous four years. See Record, pg. 32.
4.

Prior to being charged with the offense of Sexual Abuse of a Child in 1998,

Sergio had never been charged with, or convicted of, a crime. See Record, pg. 33.
5.

Sergio and his wife have two children, Lilibeth and Sergio Jr.. Both of Sergio's

children were born in the United States and are residents of the State of Utah. See Record, pg.
33.
4

6.

Sergio's children, Lilibeth and Sergio Jr., are currently ages 16 and 14,

respectively. Lilibeth has been attending Tooele High School and Sergio Jr. is currently
attending Tooele Junior High School. See Record, pg. 33.
7.

Prior to Sergio's deportation, he was active in the community as a member of the

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. See Record, pg. 33.
8.

Sergio, at all times relevant hereto, considered being together with his family in

the United States and the related opportunities to be of paramount importance in his life. See
Record, pg. 33.
9.

Sergio, likewise, considered the immigration consequences of pleading guilty to

any alleged criminal activity to be of paramount significance. See Record, pg. 33.
10.

On May 29,1998, charges were filed against Sergio for "SEXUAL ABUSE OF A

CHILD," pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1, a Second Degree Felony. See Record, pg.
37-38.
11.

Prior to May 29, 1998, Sergio had no criminal history other than minor traffic

violations. See Record, pg. 33.
12.

Sergio has always maintained his innocence of the charge of Sexual Abuse of a

Child. See Record, pg. 33.
13.

From August 11, 1998, when Sergio was arraigned, through June 30,1999,

Sergio's case was continued for numerous reasons. See Record, pg. 37-52.
14.

On June 30, 1999, Sergio pled guilty to "ATTEMPTED SEXUAL ABUSE OF A

CHILD" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1, a Third Degree Felony. See Record, pg. 4748. At that time, the Court advised Sergio of his rights and penalties. See Record, pg. 47-48. A
pre-sentence investigation was ordered and sentencing was scheduled for August 2,1999. See
5

Record, pg. 47-48.
15.

Sergio only pled guilty to Attempted Sexual Abuse of a Child because his prior

attorney, Jorge Galvez ("Galvez"), insisted that he would lose if he took his case to trial. See
Record, pgs. 33-34.
16.

Prior to pleading guilty on June 30,1999, Sergio asked Galvez whether Sergio

would be deported if he pled guilty to Attempted Sexual Abuse of a Child. See Record, pg. 33.
17.

Sergio remembers Galvez telling him that he "might be deported, but that he was not

sure." See Record, pg. 33.
18.

Lourdes Llamas, Sergio's wife, recalls Galvez telling "Sergio that Sergio 'might' be

deported for pleading guilty to the charge
19.

" See Record, pg. 36.

Galvez also told Sergio that he did not have a good chance of winning at trial and if

he did not accept the plea bargain, he would go to prison for a period of up to fifteen years. See
Record, pg. 33-34, 36.
20.

Based on Galvez' legal advice, Sergio pled guilty to "ATTEMPTED SEXUAL

ABUSE OF A CHILD" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1. See Record, pg. 34, 36.
21.

Sergio would not have pled guilty to the criminal charge if he knew that he was

pleading guilty to an "aggravated felony" under immigration law; and would therefore be subject
to automatic removal and deportation. Rather, Sergio would have gone to trial to prove his
innocence. See Record, pg. 34.
22.

On July 29, 1999, Sergio, through his attorney, filed a Request For Withdrawal Of

Guilty Plea with the Court. See Record, pg. 62-63.
23.

Sergio then changed attorneys from Galvez to Robert M. Archuleta ("Mr.

Archuleta"), who entered his appearance on August 4, 1999. Mr. Archuleta then filed a "Motion
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To Withdraw Guilty Plea" and a Memorandum in support of the Motion To Withdraw. See
Record, pg. 65-74.
24.

On November 11, 1999, the Court conducted an Evidentiary Hearing regarding

Sergio's Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea. Mr. Archuleta called Sergio, his wife, Lourdes
Llamas, and Galvez, as witnesses at the Evidentiary Hearing. See Record, pg. 75-80.
25.

The Court found that Galvez' assistance of counsel was not objectively

unreasonable and denied Sergio's Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea. See Record, pg. 75-80.
26.

On February 14, 2000, Sergio was sentenced to 180 days in the Salt Lake County

Jail. The sentence included a provision for early release into INS custody for deportation. See
Record, pg. 53-54.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Sergio's petition for post-conviction relief should not be dismissed based upon a one-year
statute of limitations. It is in the interests of justice to adjudicate Sergio's claim for postconviction relief on the merits because Sergio was denied effective assistance of counsel under
new rules of constitutional law that should be retroactively applied to Sergio's case.
Specifically, Sergio was denied effective assistance of counsel where: (1) Sergio was not advised
of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an "aggravated felony"; and (2) Sergio was
affirmatively misadvised of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an "aggravated
felony."
It is also in the interests of justice to adjudicate Sergio's claim for post-conviction relief
on the merits because Sergio's Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief raises meritorious
claims.
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First, Sergio was denied the effective assistance of counsel where his attorney failed to
advise him of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an "aggravated felony" under
the Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule. This Court should adopt the Significance
of the Collateral Consequence Rule in the wake of AEDPA and IIRIRA. AEDPA and IIR1RA
have caused drastic changes to immigration law which make the McFadden rule untenable.
More importantly, policy considerations in the wake of AEDPA and IIRIRA militate adopting
the Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule. The Significance of the Collateral
Consequence Rule should be applied retroactively to Sergio as it is not a prophylactic rule and its
retroactive application would have a minimal effect on our criminal justice system.
Second, Sergio was denied the effective assistance of counsel where his attorney
affirmatively misadvised him of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an
"aggravated felony." In Rojas-Martinez, the Utah Court of Appeals adopted a new rule, the
Affirmative Misadvice Rule. The Affirmative Misadvice Rule was a new rule because the issue
of whether to adopt the Affirmative Misadvice Rule was an issue of first impression in Utah and
the Affirmative Misasdivce Rule was not dictated or compelled by precedent. The Affirmative
Misadvice Rule should be retroactively applied to Sergio because it is not a prophylactic rule and
its retroactive application would have a minimal effect on our criminal justice system.
Third, Sergio's Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief raises meritorious claims, as
delineated infra, and thus should be adjudicated on the merits.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE EXCEPTION TO THE POST-CONVICTION
REMEDIES ACT SHOULD APPLY WHERE SERGIO WAS NOT ADVISED OF
THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF PLEADING GUILTY TO AN
"AGGRAVATED FELONY."
The interests of justice exception to the Post-Conviction Remedies Act should apply

where a new rule is announced that should be retroactively applied. The Court should adopt the
Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule1 and hold that in the wake of AEDPA and
DRIRA it constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel to fail to advise an alien
defendant of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an "aggravated felony. See Rob
A. Justman, The Effects of AEDPA andllRIRA on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims for
Failure to Advise Alien Defendants of Deportation Consequences of Pleading Guilty to an
"Aggravated Felony ", 2004 UTAH L. REV. 701. This Court should also hold that the
Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule retroactively applies to Sergio Llamas
Rodriguez' ("Sergio's") case.
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act establishes a one-year statute of limitations for
petitions for post-conviction relief.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-35a-107(l) (2002). The Post-

Conviction Remedies Act does not specifically provide for an exception to the statute of
limitations where the petitioner alleges that a new rule of constitutional law should be
retroactively applied to the petitioner's case. However, the Post-Conviction Remedies Act does
1

The Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule was first proposed by Judge
Mikva of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. See United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 61
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (Mikva, J., concurring). Counsel at bar, Rob A. Justman, argued strenuously
for the adoption of the Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule in a Utah Law Review
Comment. See Rob A. Justman, The Effects of AEDPA and IIRIRA on Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Claims for Failure to Advise Alien Defendants of Deportation Consequences of
Pleading Guilty to an "Aggravated Felony f\ 2004 UTAH L. REV. 701.
9

provide that "if the Court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a
petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations." Id. at § 78-35a-107(3). It is in the
interests of justice to waive a one-year statute of limitations where Sergio demonstrates that a
new rule of constitutional law should be applied retroactively to his case.
Sergio's previous attorney, Jorge Galvez ("Galvez"), provided ineffective assistance of
counsel where he failed to advise Sergio of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an
"aggravated felony." In State v. McFadden, the Utah Court of Appeals held that failure to advise
an alien defendant of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an offense does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 884 P.2d 1303,1304-05 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Subsequent to the McFadden decision, there have been drastic changes to immigration law
which make it objectively unreasonable for an attorney to fail to advise an alien defendant of the
deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an "aggravated felony." Prior to these drastic
changes to immigration law, Sergio's offense would not have been an "aggravated felony" and
would not have resulted in automatic deportation. Subsequent to these drastic changes to
immigration law, Sergio's offense is considered an "aggravated felony" and subjects Sergio to
automatic deportation.
At the time Sergio pled guilty to Attempted Sexual Abuse of a Child, he was a lawful
permanent resident, had lived in the United States for thirteen years, and considered the United
States his home. All of Sergio's family lived in the United States, and Sergio owned a home in
the United States. In short, Sergio felt the United States was his country, and he loved his
country. Under these circumstances, Sergio could not have been expected to know, without an
attorney advising him, that Congress had decided to throw people in his position out of their
home and country after so many years.
10

It is apropos to remember that
A court must have an eye toward the particularly harsh consequences for
"unpopular groups or individuals" unlucky enough to be the targets of fleeting
politically-motivated passionate outbursts. Special attention to reviled, outcast
groups is needed in a variety of contexts. There are few groups of adults and
children so routinely ostracized and so voiceless in our democracy as nonenfranchised, non-citizen immigrants even though they form a vibrant and
integral part of American society
Mojica v. Reno, 970 F.Supp. 130, 176 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
A.

Sergio was denied effective assistance of counsel where Galvez failed to
advise him that he would be automatically deported if he pled guilty to an
"aggravated felony."

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to effective assistance of counsel. See U.S.
CONST. AMEND. VI.

"In deciding a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the test

set out in Strickland v. Washington. 'Under the Strickland test, an individual has been denied the
effective assistance of counsel if: (1) counsel's performance was deficient below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and (2) counsel's performance prejudiced the
defendant.'" State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App 203,16, 73 P.3d 967.
The legal counsel provided by Galvez dropped below an objective standard of
reasonableness where Galvez failed to advise Sergio that he would be automatically deported if
he pled guilty to an "aggravated felony." This omission prejudiced Sergio because Sergio would
never have pled guilty had he known the real consequences of pleading guilty would be
automatic deportation, and not merely 180 days in the Salt Lake County Jail.
B.

The rule adopted in State v. McFadden has been irreparably eroded by
changes to immigration law made subsequent to that decision.

The holding in State v. McFadden, that failure to advise an alien defendant of the
deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an offense does not constitute ineffective
11

assistance of counsel, has been irreparably eroded since the time it was decided in 1994. 884
P.2d 1303, 1304-05 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). When McFadden was decided, deportation was only
a possible consequence of a conviction for a heinous felony, whereas today, deportation is an
automatic consequence of a guilty plea to relatively minor misdemeanor offenses.
In McFadden, the Utah Court of Appeals held that failure of counsel to advise an alien
defendant of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an offense does not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel. The court reached its conclusion based upon the collateral
consequences doctrine. Id. The collateral consequences doctrine is that so long as a defendant's
attorney advises the defendant of the direct consequences of conviction, i.e. the sentence and/or
fine imposed, failure of counsel to advise the defendant of any collateral consequences of
conviction, such as loss of a drivers license, loss of a government job, or deportation, does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
Since McFadden was decided in 1994, immigration laws have undergone drastic changes
that render the holding of McFadden unsound. In 1996, with the passage of the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132,110 Stat. 1214
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), and the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208,110 Stat.
3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), drastic changes were
wrought on immigration law.
Prior to the passage of AEDPA and IIRIRA, an alien was subject to deportation if the
alien committed an "aggravated felony." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (1989) (amended by IIRIRA §
321(b)). At that time, only a few felonious and heinous crimes were denominated "aggravated
felonies." See id. at § 1101(a)(43)(F), (G), (J) (murder, illicit possession of destructive device,
12

and drug trafficking by aliens constitute aggravated felonies) (amended by IIRIRA § 321(b)).
Even if the alien pled guilty to one of these felonious and heinous crimes, the alien was still
entitled to seek discretionary relief from deportation based on equitable considerations. See
I.N.A. § 212(c) (1994) (repealed by AEDPA and recodified by IIRIRA at 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)).
This has all changed in the wake of AEDPA and IIRIRA.
First, the term "aggravated felony" has been expanded to draconian proportions to
include minor and common offenses, such as theft resulting in a one-year suspended sentence.
Id. § 1101(a)(43)(G). Second, all discretionary relief from deportation has been removed for
those convicted of an "aggravated felony." See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (alien not eligible for
cancellation of removal if alien convicted of "aggravated felony").
1.

Drastic changes to immigration law caused by AEDPA and IIRIRA.

In 1996, the immigration law landscape underwent drastic changes with the passage of
AEDPA and IIRIRA. Subsequent to AEDPA and IIRIRA, the term "aggravated felony" has
been expanded to draconian proportions to include minor and common offenses, such as
misdemeanor theft or misdemeanor burglary resulting in a one-year suspended sentence. See 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (1994) (term "aggravated felony" includes theft or burglary for which
i

term of imprisonment is one year or more). Specifically, under AEDPA and IIRIRA, the
following minor and common offenses, inter alia, are considered aggravated felonies: theft,
bribery, or burglary, for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year; gambling offenses;
and obstruction of justice. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)-(U) (1994) (as amended by IIRIRA §
321(b)). Moreover, any attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses is also considered an
"aggravated felony." See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U) (1994) (as amended by IIRIRA § 321(b)).
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Under Utah law, AEDPA and IIRIRA mandate the automatic deportation of an alien who
pleads guilty to theft of property valued at $300. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-412(l)(c); 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (1994) (term "aggravated felony" includes theft or burglary for which
term of imprisonment is one year or more). Under Utah law, an alien who pleads guilty to theft
of property valued at at least $300, but less than $1000, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-6-412(l)(c). Under Utah law, a class A misdemeanor is punishable by a

term of imprisonment "not exceeding one year." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-204 (emphasis
added).
A Justice of the California Supreme Court, Justice Mosk, has noted that under AEDPA
and IIRIRA "'[aggravated felony' is a federal term of art that covers a broad variety of crimes,
many of them relatively minor. It includes such misdemeanors as trivial batteries, possession for
sale of a marijuana cigarette, and theft resulting in a one-year suspended sentence. All of these,
even if misdemeanors under a state law, are aggravated felonies in federal concept." In re
Resendiz, 19 P.3d 1171, 1188 (Cal. 2001) (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations
omitted).
It is peculiar that an offense that is neither aggravated nor a felony would be denominated
an "aggravated felony." Indeed, Justice Mosk, commenting on the changes to immigration law
caused by AEDPA and IIRIRA, has observed "[i]n recent years, the immigration consequences
of criminal convictions have verged on the monstrously cruel in their harshness compared to
many of the crimes on which they are imposed." Id. at 1188 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting). Justice Mosk goes on to note that the practical consequences of AEDPA and
IIRIRA are that immigrants are tom away from their families after decades in the United States,
to be sent to countries where they know no one and do not speak the language. See id, at 118914

90 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) (("'I think that it's time that people thought about
deportation for what it is

[I]t's almost like a little death penalty case every time you do one.

. . . [W]hen you see the families, particularly the mothers, this is about the worst thing that can
happen to a family.'") (quoting CHEVIGNY, Tins AMERICAN LIFE, episode No. 170, Immigration
Radio, WBEZ, Chicago, broadcast Oct. 13,2000)).
As previously noted, prior to AEDPA and IIRIRA, aliens ordered deported because of
convictions for an "aggravated felony" were still eligible for waivers of their orders of
deportation under INA § 212(c). See INA § 212(c) (1995) (repealed by AEDPA and recodified
by IIRIRA at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b). With the passage of IIRIRA, section 212(c) relief was
eliminated for those convicted of "aggravated felonies." See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. Specifically,
IIRIRA amended the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 ("INA"), to provide that the
Attorney General may only cancel removal for a long-term, permanent resident alien who "has
resided in the United States continuously for seven years after having been admitted in any
status, and [] has not been convicted of any aggravated felony." See id. at § 1229b(a) (emphasis
added).
This provision is potentially the most draconian feature of AEDPA and IIRIRA, as prior
to AEDPA and IIRIRA section 212(c) relief was the most common form of relief from
deportation for alien defendants, and was commonly granted by immigration judges. See, e.g.,
United States v. El-Nobani, 145 F.Supp.2d 906, 910 (N.D. Ohio 2001), overruled by El-Nobani
v. United States, 287 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2002) ("While § 212(c) relief was technically
discretionary in nature, it is well recognized by the federal courts that if a person's crime was
relatively minor, and if his equities were great, the alien would not be deported."). Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court has observed that between 1989 and 1995 alone, 10,000 aliens
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were granted discretionary relief from deportation orders under section 212(c). I.N.S. v. St. Cyr,
533 U.S. 289, 296 (2001). Moreover, the Court has observed that prior to AEDPA and IIRIRA,
section 212(c) relief was commonly granted, with half of all petitions for discretionary relief
under section 212(c) being granted. Id. at 296 n.5. Under section 212(c), an alien defendant who
pled guilty to an offense was still eligible for discretionary relief from deportation so long as the
alien had spent seven years of lawful permanent residence in the United States with a "generally
good record." See El-Nobani, 145 F.Supp.2d at 910, overruled by El-Nobani, 287 F.3d 417. An
alien could show a generally good record by showing employment, family ties in the United
States, lack of family ties in the country of origin, and that the offense was not very serious. Id.
Under AEDPA and IIRIRA, there is no more discretionary relief from deportation orders.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (aliens shall be deported for conviction of "aggravated felony"); 8
U.S.C. § 1229b (alien not eligible for cancellation of removal if alien convicted of "aggravated
felony")- There is no more individualized weighing of the equities to determine whether
deportation is appropriate in a particular case. See id. Rather, an alien will be automatically
deported if the alien pleads guilty to a relatively trivial misdemeanor offense denominated in federal
law as an "aggravated felony." See, e.g., State v. Jimenez, 987 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)
(alien defendant automatically deported as aggravated felon for pleading guilty to misdemeanor
theft, for which he received a 365 day suspended sentence).
The alien will not be permitted to show the court that the alien has lived in the United States
for almost his or her entire life and during that time he or she has been a contributing member to
society. See, e.g., Berkow v. State, 583 N.W.2d 562,563 (Minn. 1998) (Gary, twenty-five year-old
alien who had lived in United States since age twelve, was automatically deported for misdemeanor
theft). The alien will not be able to show the court that the alien has a generally good record, nor
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that the present offense is a relatively trivial blemish on an otherwise clean record. See 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (aliens shall be deported for conviction of "aggravated felony"); 8 U.S.C. §
1229b (alien not eligible for cancellation of removal if alien convicted of "aggravated felony")- The
alien will not be able to show the court that the alien has established a home and family in the
United States, has no home or family in the alien's country of origin, and doesn't even speak the
language of the country of origin. See id. No, the alien will not be permitted to show the court any
of this, the alien will simply be deported. See id.
2.

The drastic changes caused by AEDPA and IIRIRA make the rule of
McFadden untenable.

The drastic changes to immigration law caused by AEDPA and IIRIRA have removed
the rationale for the McFadden rule for two reasons.
First, although it was reasonable to expect an alien defendant to be aware that
commission of serious crimes, like those denominated aggravated felonies prior to the passage of
AEDPA and IIRIRA, would have deportation consequences, a defendant cannot be expected to
foresee that trivial misdemeanor offenses, such as misdemeanor theft where no jail time is
served, will result in automatic deportation. Moreover, even if the alien defendant is aware that
deportation may result from a guilty plea, the alien defendant is unlikely to be aware that
deportation will be automatic and that the alien will be ineligible for discretionary relief.
Because of the draconian treatment of aliens caused by AEDPA and IIRIRA, the
deportation consequences of guilty pleas are both objectively and subjectively more significant
to aliens, like Sergio, than the direct consequences of guilty pleas. For example, Sergio will be
automatically deported away from his family, friends, and home even though he has lived and
worked in the United States for over fourteen years. What makes this such a gross miscarriage
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of justice is that Sergio would not have entered the guilty plea if he had known of the deportation
consequences.
Second, prior to the passage of AEDPA and IIRIRA, the decision of whether to deport an
alien defendant who pled guilty to an "aggravated felony" was left to the discretion of the
Immigration Judge. See INA § 212(c) (repealed by AEDPA) (providing for discretionary relief
from deportation order based upon "aggravated felony" conviction so long as alien was not
imprisoned for five or more years on basis of conviction). It may have been impossible for an
attorney to advise an alien defendant of the likelihood of deportation prior to the passage of
AEDPA and IIRIRA because of the discretionary power of the INS over the decision. See INA §
212(c) (repealed by AEDPA) (providing for discretionary relief from deportation order based
upon "aggravated felony" conviction so long as alien was not imprisoned for five or more years
on basis of conviction). This left defense attorneys to play the guessing game of whether an
alien defendant would be deported or would be eligible for discretionary relief. Under such
circumstances it would have been problematic to require criminal defense attorneys to learn
complex principles of immigration law.
However, in the wake of AEDPA and IIRIRA, deportation can be easily and accurately
predicted for "aggravated felony" convictions, as in these circumstances deportation results
automatically by operation of federal statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (aliens shall be
deported for conviction of "aggravated felony"); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (alien not eligible for
cancellation of removal if alien convicted of "aggravated felony"). It does not take special
knowledge of immigration law to consult a single federal statute to determine if the offense one's
client is charged with is an "aggravated felony."
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C.

In the wake of AEDPA and IIRIRA, this Court should adopt the Significance
of the Collateral Consequence Rule

It may very well have been objectively reasonable to fail to advise an alien defendant of
the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an "aggravated felony" prior to the passage of
AEDPA and IIRIRA, and at the time McFadden was decided. However, in the wake of AEDPA
and IIRIRA, failure of counsel to advise an alien defendant of the deportation consequences of
pleading guilty to an "aggravated felony" constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, and this
Court should so hold. Deportation is different from the host of other collateral consequences that
may flow from a guilty plea to an offense. See, e.g., United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55,
61 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Mikva, J., concurring) ("deportation is in a category so obviously distinct
from the other collateral consequences....").
For alien defendants, the most significant legal consequence of a guilty plea to an offense
is deportation. See, e.g., id. ("The possibility of being deported can be—and frequently is—the
most important factor in a criminal defendant's decision how to plead."); State v. Ramirez, 636
N.W.2d 740,744 (Iowa 2001) ("Deportation may be a penalty more severe than a prison
sentence."). Deportation can result in "loss of property or life; or of all that makes life worth
living." Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). Moreover, deportation is the
equivalent to "a life sentence of exile." Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 243 (1951)
(Jackson, J., dissenting). Deportation results in the loss of one's job and banishment from one's
home and family. See, e.g., People v. Davidovich, 618 N.W.2d 579, 584 (Mich. 2000) (Kelly, J.,
dissenting) (observing that alien defendant lost home and family as result of pleading guilty to
"aggravated felony"). It can and does permanently separate the deportee from his spouse,
children, and other loved ones. For example, in People v. Davidovich, the court lamented that an
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alien defendant would "lose his home, his business, and conceivably his family" as a result of a
conviction for an "aggravated felony." Id. at 584 (Kelly, J., dissenting)
Where a paramount consequence like deportation is at stake, a rigid collateral
consequences rule, which provides that no information about deportation need be furnished to an
alien defendant by his counsel, is inappropriate. Such a rigid categorical bar should be replaced
by a rule that focuses on the significance of the collateral consequence in determining whether
counsel has a duty to advise the alien defendant of the collateral consequence. Under this rule,
denominated the Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule, where the consequence is
"most significant," as deportation most certainly is, then counsel has a duty to advise the alien
client of the collateral consequence.
Such a Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule should be adopted. Deportation is
different from any other collateral consequence. In no other area of the law can a plea of guilty to a
misdemeanor result in such drastic consequences, such as being permanently excluded from Uving
with one's family or in one's home after decades of Uving with one's family and in one's home as a
lawful permanent resident. Moreover, counsel's duty is to ensure that the alien defendant makes an
informed decision when the alien defendant decides to plead guilty. If this duty is to have any
meaning, then, at a minimum, it must require attorneys to inform their clients of the significant
consequences that will automaticaUy flow from a guilty plea.

2

The Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule was first proposed by Judge
Mikva of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. See United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 61
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (Mikva, J., concurring). Counsel at bar, Rob A. Justman, argued strenuously
for the adoption of the Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule in a Utah Law Review
Comment. See Rob A. Justman, The Effects ofAEDPA and IIRIRA on Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Claims for Failure to Advise Alien Defendants of Deportation Consequences of
Pleading Guilty to an "AggravatedFelony", 2004 U T A H L . REV. 701.
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At least one court has held that it constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel
to fail to advise an alien defendant of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an
"aggravated felony" in the wake of AEDPA and IIRIRA. See State v. Vieira, 760 A.2d 840,
843-44 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000) ("counsel's performance is constitutionally deficient if
the attorney does not address the issue of deportation with the defendant and the defendant is not
aware of the risk of deportation."). Moreover, four courts adopted this view prior to the passage
of AEDPA and IIRIRA. See, e.g., People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 526-30 (Colo. 1987) (holding
that where counsel is aware that client is alien defendant, failure to advise alien defendant of
deportation consequences of pleading guilty may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel);
Williams v. State, 641 N.E.2d 44,48-49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) ("It is ourfirmbelief that the
consequence of deportation, whether labeled collateral or not, is of sufficient seriousness that it
constitutes ineffective assistance for an attorney to fail to advise a noncitizen defendant of the
deportation consequences of a guilty plea."); State v. Arvanitis, 522 N.E.2d 1089,1094-95 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1986) (stating that there are "no hard and fast rule[s]" when alien defendants allege
ineffective assistance of counsel on basis of failure to advise of deportation consequences of
conviction, rather, ineffective assistance of counsel is to be determined on case-by-case basis);
Lyons v. Pearce, 694 P.2d 969, 976-78 (Or. 1985) ("One function a criminal defense attorney
performs for a client is to disclose the consequences of a guilty plea and conviction. For noncitizen defendants awareness of the possibility of deportation is necessary to an informed plea.").
D.

The policy behind crafting a broad exception to the collateral consequences
rule in Rojas-Martinez and other practical considerations support the
adoption of the Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule

The Utah Court of Appeals, in State v. Rojas-Martinez, provides support for the adoption
of the Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule. See State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT
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App 203,58-10, 73 P.3d 963. In Rojas-Martinez, the court held that it constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel for counsel to advise an alien defendant that the alien defendant may or
may not be deported based upon a conviction for an "aggravated felony." See id. at 969 (holding
that attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel where attorney advised alien defendant
that deportation "might or might not" result from plea of guilty to "aggravated felony" under
misadvice exception to collateral consequences doctrine).
The Rojas-Martinez court went on to observe that holding that the alien defendant's
counsel's performance constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under the affirmative
misadvice exception makes sense in light of the fact that "'[d]eportation, although collateral, is,
nonetheless, a drastic consequence. In most cases this collateral consequence is more severe
than the penalty imposed by the court in response to the plea.'" Id. (quoting People v. Correct,
485 N.E.2d 307, 311 (111. 1985)). The Utah Court of Appeals also felt that the holding in RojasMartinez "makes particular sense in light of the Supreme Court's recent analysis in INS v. St.
Cyr.:9 Id.3LtfSn.3.
In St. Cyr., the U.S. Supreme Court stated in dicta that only incompetent defense counsel
would fail to advise an alien defendant of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an
"aggravated felony." Id. at 321. The issue in St. Cyr. was whether the repeal of § 212(c)
discretionary relief, caused by IBRJRA, applied retroactively to bar discretionary relief from
deportation orders founded upon pre-IIRIRA convictions. Id. at 292-94. The St. Cyr. Court held
that the repeal of section 212(c) did not apply retroactively to pre-IIRIRA convictions, and thus
those convicted prior to DRIRA could still rely on section 212(c) discretionary relief. Id. at 325.
The Supreme Court explained that this holding was necessary since alien defendants who entered
guilty pleas prior to the enactment of AEDPA and IIRIRA did so in reliance on the availability
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of section 212(c) relief from deportation, and would not have entered guilty pleas if they had
known that section 212(c) relief was unavailable. Id. at 321-23. Thus, the Supreme Court
treated the immigration consequences of a guilty plea as a determinative consideration in an
alien's decision of whether to plead guilty to an offense. See id.
The Supreme Court made it explicitly clear that deportation, although a collateral
consequence, is of considerable importance for alien defendants considering whether to plead
guilty to an offense. The Supreme Court stated, "[tjhere can be little doubt that, as a general
matter, alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely aware of
the immigration consequences of their convictions." Id. More importantly, despite it's status as
a collateral consequence, the Supreme Court recognized that competent defense counsel advises
the alien defendant of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an "aggravated felony."
"Even if the defendant was not initially aware of § 212(c), competent defense counsel, following
the advice of numerous practice guides, would have advised him concerning the provision's
importance." Id. at 323 n.50. "The Court also noted that 'the American Bar Association's
Standards for Criminal Justice provide that, if a defendant will face deportation as a result of
conviction, defense counsel "should fully advise the defendant of these consequences.'" RojasMartinez, 2003 UT App at fS n.3 (quoting St. Cyr., 533 U.S. at 323 n.50).
1.

The policy behind crafting a broad exception to the collateral
consequences rule in Roias-Martinez provides support for the adoption of
the Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule.

The Rojas-Martinez decision crafts a broad exception to the collateral consequences
doctrine under what has been termed the "misadvice exception to the collateral consequences
doctrine." See id. While the Misadvice Exception was recognized prior to the passage of
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AEDPA and IIRIRA, it was a weak and feeble relative of the "new," vibrant, and broad
Misadvice Exception that has emerged in the wake of AEDPA and IIRIRA.
Prior to the passage of AEDPA and IIRIRA, the Misadvice Exception applied "when
counsel affirmatively, but erroneously, represents that the accused will not be subject to
deportation." State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303, 1305 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); see also
Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534,1538-41 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that counsel
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel under affirmative Misadvice Exception where counsel
positively told alien defendant he would not be deported if he pled guilty when in fact he would
be deported if he pled guilty); People v. Correa, 485 N.E.2d 307, 311-12 (111. 1985) (counsel
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel advised alien defendant that he would
not be deported if he pled guilty when in fact alien defendant would be deported if he pled
guilty).
In the wake of AEDPA and IIRIRA, the Rojas-Martinez Court held that where counsel
tells an alien defendant that he "might or might not" be deported after pleading guilty to an
"aggravated felony", counsel renders ineffective assistance of counsel. Rojas-Martinez, 2003
UT App. at T7-11. In Rojas-Martinez, the Utah Court of Appeals held that an alien defendant
was not accorded effective assistance of counsel because the alien defendant's attorney failed to
advise the alien defendant that deportation was automatic and certain. 2003 UT App. at 17-11.
The court reasoned that because the alien defendant was charged with a state misdemeanor that
qualifies as an "aggravated felony" under federal immigration law and "'because the 1996
amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act eliminated all discretion as to deportation of
non-citizens convicted of aggravated felonies, [Defendant's] plea of guilty mean[s] virtually
automatic, unavoidable deportation.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 183-84
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(2nd Cir. 2002)). However, Rojas9 attorney advised him that if he entered a guilty plea he
"might or might not" be deported. Id. The Rojas-Martinez court held that because the alien
defendant's attorney misled him about the certainty of deportation, the collateral consequences
doctrine did not bar the alien defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the
affirmative Misadvice Exception to the collateral consequences doctrine applied. Id.
2.

The Misadvice Exception fails to protect those alien defendants most in
need of protection—those who do not know enough to ask whether
automatic deportation could result from a guilty plea to a relatively minor
and trivial misdemeanor offense.

This Court should not limit itself to the Misadvice Exception to the collateral consequences
doctrine because the Misadvice Exception fails to protect those alien defendants who are in most
need of protection. The alien defendants who are most in need of protection are those who fail to
ask their attorney whether deportation will resultfrompleading guilty to an offense because they are
ignorant of the possibility of deportation. Many alien defendants do not know enough about
immigration law to understand that deportation could be a consequence of pleading guilty to a
misdemeanor.
The Misadvice Exception only protects those alien defendants in least need of
protection—those who ask their attorney whether deportation will result from entering a guilty
plea to an offense because they know enough about immigration law to understand that
deportation is a real possibility. Ironically, the Misadvice Exception protects those least in need
of protection, those who understand that deportation may result from entering a guilty plea and
who seek to know the possibility of such a result, and leaves unprotected those most in need of
protection—those who are wholly unaware that deportation may result from the entry of a guilty
plea to a misdemeanor.
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Moreover, the Misadvice Exception only protects those who ask their attorney what the
deportation consequences of pleading guilty will be. The Misadvice Exception does not protect
those who rely on their attorney to inform them of all the substantial considerations that should
go into whether a guilty plea should be entered into. Yet deportation consequences are always
significant to alien defendants, and they are even more significant where the offense upon which
deportation will be imposed is a relatively trivial misdemeanor offense for which the sentence is
suspended.
In short, deportation consequences are of paramount importance to all alien defendants,
and oftentimes are determinative in deciding whether they will plead guilty to a particular
offense. Some alien defendants know enough about immigration law to voice such a concern to
their attorney, but others do not, and it is these alien defendants that are most in need of the
protection of the Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule.
E.

The Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule should be retroactively
applied to Sergio.

"The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a new rule announced by
the United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of Appeals after the
petitioner's conviction became final shall be governed by applicable state and federal principles
of retroactivity." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-104(2). The Utah Supreme Court has developed a
three-part test to determine whether a new rule should be applied retroactively to final decisions
attacked on collateral review:
We hereby explicitly adopt the following analytic standards for determining the
retroactivity of new rules in criminal cases on collateral rather than direct review: 1) the
purpose to be served by the new rule, 2) the extent of reliance on the old rule, and 3) the
effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule.
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Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81,91 (Utah 1983). Subsequently, in the 1993 decision of Labrum
v. State, 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court revisited this three-part test,
reaffirmed it, and then proceeded to elaborate on the first part of the three-part test. A year later,
in Neel v. State, the Utah Supreme Court summarized the three-part test as follows;
In Labrum, we found it useful to break our inquiry into the purpose of the new rule (the
first prong of the Andrews test) into three questions: (i) Is the new rule essentially
prophylactic? (ii) would the retroactive application of the new rule result in windfall
benefits to offenders who suffered no constitutional deprivation? and (iii) does the new
rule protect or enhance a preexisting constitutional right rather than conferring a new one.
886 P.2d 1097, 1104 (Utah 1994).
In its development and thorough analysis of this three-part test, the Utah Supreme Court
extensively relied upon federal precedent. See Andrews, 611 P.2d at 88-94. However, much of
the federal precedent relied upon by the Court in Andrews was subsequently changed or
overruled. See Labrum v. State, 870 P.2d 902,912 n.9 (Utah 1993). Despite this fact, the Utah
Supreme Court, in 1993, four years subsequent to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
league v. Illinois, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), stated:
We note the inconsistent nature of federal retroactivity law and the overruling of the
United States Supreme Court decisions we cited with approval in Andrews v. Morris.
However, the continued vitality of these decisions is irrelevant to our state law analysis.
As the Harper Court recognized, state courts are free "to limit the retroactive operation of
their own interpretations of state law." Moreover, as we noted in Andrews, "We view the
federal precedent as instructive but not binding except insofar as we explicitly
incorporate them into our own law on retroactivity." We reaffirm that principle here.
Labrum v. State, 870 P.2d 902, 912 n.9 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Moreover, in two cases subsequent to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Teague, the
Utah Supreme Court has explicitly reaffirmed the three-part test, unmodified by any federal
Teague analysis. See Labrum v. State, 870 P.2d 902, 912 (Utah 1993) (reaffirming Andrews test
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despite contrary federal authority); Neel v. State, 886 P.2d 1097,1104-05 (Utah 1994)
(reaffirming Andrews test and Labrum explication of first prong of Andrews test).
Under the Andrews three-part test the Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule
should be retroactively applied because: (1) the Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule
is not prophylactic; (2) there is minimal reliance on the McFadden rule; and (3) retroactive
application of the Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule would not adversely impact
the administration of justice.
First, the Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule is not prophylactic and its
application would not result in windfall benefits to offenders because it would only result in the
withdrawal of involuntary guilty pleas. The Court must determine what purpose is to be served
by the Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule. Andrews v. Morris, 611 P.2d 81,91
(Utah 1983). To make this determination it is useful for the court to analyze the following three
questions:
(i) Is the new rule essentially prophylactic? (ii) would the retroactive application of the
new rale result in windfall benefits to offenders who suffered no constitutional
deprivation? and (iii) does the new rule protect or enhance a preexisting constitutional
right rather than conferring a new one.
Neel v. State, 886 P.2d 1097, 1104 (Utah 1994). The purpose served by the Significance of the
Collateral Consequence Rule is to prevent alien defendants from being held to involuntary pleas
that resulted from the ineffective assistance of counsel. The Significance of the Collateral
Consequence Rule is not prophylactic, it does not impose a duty on counsel to guard against
potential involuntary pleas. Rather the prejudice prong of Strickland assures that the
Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule only serves to protect those alien defendants
who have already entered an involuntary guilty plea. See Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App. at 1728

11 ("In deciding a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the test laid out in
Strickland v. Washington. Under the Strickland test, an individual has been denied effective
assistance of counsel if: (1) counsel's performance was deficient below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment, and (2) counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant.99)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). That is, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel under
Strickland (and under Rojas-Martinez) the alien defendant must prove that the plea would not
have been entered but for the ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Therefore, the Significance
of the Collateral Consequence Rule is not prophylactic since it was not meant to prevent error
before it occurs, rather it was meant to cure error that has already occurred and that has actually
prejudiced the alien defendant.
Nor would retroactive application of the Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule
result "in windfall benefits to offenders who suffered no constitutional deprivation." Id.
Because Sergio was rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, he has suffered a "constitutional
deprivation." He has been deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel. Therefore, retroactive application of the Significance of the Collateral Consequence
Rule would not result in a "windfall benefit," but would be a vindication of Sergio's Sixth
Amendment rights. Moreover, the Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule only
"protects] or enhance[sl a preexisting constitutional right rather than conferring a new one." Id.
Therefore, retroactive application of the Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule will
not result in a "pandoras' box" of claims, rather it will only result in a few cases being brought
by alien defendants who entered involuntary pleas because they were deprived of the effective
assistance of counsel.
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Second, there is minimal reliance on the old McFadden rale. The Court must determine
"the extent of reliance on the old rule." Andrews, 677 P.2d at 91. Sergio's counsel relied on the
McFaddenralein failing to advise Sergio of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to
an "aggravated felony." However, this reliance was not as extensive as that deemed by the Utah
Supreme Court to merit only prospective application of a new rale. In Labrum, for example, the
petitioner was an inmate who was denied parole. 870 P.2d at 903-05. In making the
determination to deny the inmate parole, the parole board relied upon information that was not
disclosed or made available to the inmate. Id. Under prior precedent, the inmate had no right to
such information. Id. However, the Labrum Court held that due process "requires that the
inmate know what information the Board will be considering at the hearing and that the inmate
know soon enough in advance to have a reasonable opportunity to prepare responses and rebuttal
of inaccuracies." Id. at 909. In holding that this new rale was limited to prospective application,
the Court stated that "the Board has relied quite heavily, perhaps exclusively, on the longstanding procedural standard of discretionary notice and disclosure.... To now declare invalid
each parole decision held in accordance with past law would work a fundamental injustice on the
Board, the judiciary and the citizens of this state" because
[rjetroactive application of the rale we announce today might require the Board to reopen
the original parole grant hearings of every inmate and parolee currently under the Board's
authority. This would force the Board to rehear proceedings which did not offend due
process and resulted in entirely fair and accurate parole determinations. We are
convinced that the vast majority of prior original parole determinations fall into this
category.
Mat 913.
In stark contrast to the situation in Labrum, and as noted above, to apply the Significance
of the Collateral Consequence Rule retroactively would not result in a "fundamental injustice,"
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as Utah courts would be required to revisit a small number of cases in which alien defendants
actually suffered a constitutional deprivation. Additionally, the prejudice prong of Strickland
would weed out the majority of the few cases that are, in fact, brought. Moreover, unlike the
vast majority of parole determinations that were and are accurate and fair, the vast majority of
pleas that were entered into based upon ignorance of the deportation consequences are
involuntary and unfair. Retroactive application of the Significance of the Collateral
Consequence Rule would assure that the small number of alien defendants who entered guilty
pleas to "aggravated felonies" entered such pleas voluntarily and in accordance with the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Third, adoption of the Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule would not
adversely impact the administration of justice. The Court must determine "the effect on the
administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule." Andrews, 677 P.2d at 91.
This factor also strongly supports the retroactive application of the Significance of the Collateral
Consequence Rule. In Labrum, the court determined that the third Andrews factor favored nonretroactive because the reopening of every original parole grant hearing would result in "a
serious interference with the system of criminal justice." 870 P.2d at 913. Unlike Labrum, it has
been amply demonstrated here that there would be minimal impact on our criminal justice
system by the retroactive application of the Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule.
There are several reasons which support this conclusion.
Foremost, there are few aliens who are capable of bringing ineffective assistance of
counsel claims for failure to advise of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an
"aggravated felony" because aliens that have plead guilty to an "aggravated felony" are subject
to automatic and mandatory deportation without any hope of discretionary relief. See Rojas31

Martinez, 2003 UT App. at 17-11 (noting that it is certain that the defendant who pleads guilty to
an "aggravated felony" is subject to automatic and unavoidable deportation). Therefore, any
alien that brings a claim based upon a conviction that was final before the Significance of the
Collateral Consequence Rule was adopted has already been deported. There are very few aliens,
if any, who hire counsel in Utah to contest their conviction after the alien has been deported.
Moreover, as noted supra, of those deported aliens who do hire counsel to contest their
convictions, their slight numbers will be further weeded out by the prejudice prong of Strickland.
That is, only those aliens that can show that they would not have entered their guilty plea but for
the ineffective assistance of counsel will be able to bring a meritorious claim.
II.

THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE EXCEPTION TO THE POST-CONVICTION
REMEDIES ACT SHOULD APPLY WHERE SERGIO WAS AFFIRMATIVELY
MISADVISED OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF PLEADING
GUILTY TO AN "AGGRAVATED FELONY."
The interests of justice exception to the Post-Conviction Remedies Act should apply

where a new rule is announced that should be applied retroactively. Sergio was affirmatively
misadvised of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an "aggravated felony" under
the Affirmative Misadvice Rule announced in State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App 203, 73
P.3d 967, where Galvez advised him that he might be deported, when he was certain to be
deported, if he pled guilty to an "aggravated felony." See Record, pg. 36. The Court should
apply the Affirmative Misadvice Rule announced in Rojas-Martinez retroactively to Sergio's
case.
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act establishes a one-year statute of limitations for
petitions for post-conviction relief. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107(l) (2002). The PostConviction Remedies Act does not specifically provide for an exception where the petitioner
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alleges that a new rule of constitutional law should be retroactively applied to the petitioner's
case. However, the Post-Conviction Remedies Act does provide that "if the Courtfindsthat the
interests of justice require, a court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file within the time
limitations." Id. at § 78-35a-107(3). It is clearly in the interests of justice to waive a one-year
statute of limitations where the petitioner demonstrates that a new rule of constitutional law
should be retroactively applied to the petitioner's case.
Sergio is entitled to have the one-year statute of limitation waived by the Court in "the
interests of justice" since he can demonstrate that a new rule of constitutional law should be
applied retroactively to his case.
A.

Sergio was provided ineffective assistance of counsel under Rojas-Martinez
where his attorney told him that he might be deported if he pled guilty to an
"aggravated felony."

Sergio was furnished ineffective assistance of counsel where he was affirmatively
misadvised by his attorney that he might be deported if he pled guilty to an "aggravated felony."
There is a factual dispute as to what Galvez actually advised Sergio. Lourdes Llamas, Sergio's
wife, remembers Galvez telling Sergio "that Sergio 'might' be deported for pleading guilty to the
charge." Record, pg. 36. Sergio remembers his attorney advising him "that I might be deported
but that he was not sure," if Sergio pled guilty to an "aggravated felony." Record, pg. 33. This
factual dispute, arising out of affidavits, can only be resolved at a hearing where Sergio and his
wife can testify and the trial court judge can make factual findings. Absent such a hearing, we
are left with an unresolved factual dispute.
Regardless, both statements clearly amount to affirmative misrepresentations of the
deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an "aggravated felony." If Galvez did advise
Sergio "that [Sergio] might be deported but that he was not sure," Record, pg. 33, this amounts
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to an affirmative misrepresentation of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an
"aggravated felony." With this statement, Galvez objectively communicated to Sergio that he
might be deported, but that Galvez was unsure as to whether Sergio would actually be deported.
Under federal immigration law, a plea of guilty to an "aggravated felony" results in automatic
and certain deportation, not possible deportation. In Rojas-Martinez, the Utah Court of Appeals
held that where a defendant was told by his attorney that "he might or might not be deported" if
he pled guilty to an "aggravated felony", the defendant was furnished affirmative misadvice, and
hence, ineffective assistance of counsel. 2003 UT App 203,16-10.
The statement by Galvez is indistinguishable from the statement of the defendant's
attorney in Rojas-Martinez. Therefore, Sergio was given affirmative misadvice and his legal
representation was constitutionally defective.
In Rojas-Martinez, the defendant, Tomas, pled guilty to a misdemeanor offense that
qualified as an "aggravated felony" under federal immigration law and was sentenced to 365
days in jail. 2003 UT App 203, ^6-10. Tomas entered the plea of guilty after being told by his
attorney "that his guilty plea and conviction could lead to deportation, but it might or might not."
Id. at 19.
The Utah Court of Appeals held that Tomas was not accorded effective assistance of
counsel because Tomas' attorney failed to advise Tomas that deportation was automatic and
certain. Id. at 969-70. The court reasoned that because Tomas was charged with a state
misdemeanor that qualifies as an "aggravated felony" under federal immigration law and
"'because the 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act eliminated all discretion
as to deportation of non-citizens convicted of aggravated felonies, [Defendant's] plea of guilty
mean[s] virtually automatic, unavoidable deportation.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Couto, 311
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F.3d 179,183-84 (2nd Cir. 2002)). However, Tomas' attorney advised him that if he entered a
guilty plea he "might or might not" be deported. Id. The court held that because Tomas'
attorney misled him about the certainty of deportation, the collateral consequences doctrine did
not bar Tomas's ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the affirmative misadvice
exception to the collateral consequences doctrine applied. Id.
Like Tomas in Rojas-Martinez, Sergio was advised that he might be deported if he pled
guilty to an "aggravated felony". If Sergio's wife's recollection is more accurate, then Sergio
was clearly advised, like Tomas, that Sergio "might" be deported. Record, pg. 36. If Sergio's
recollection is more accurate, then Sergio was told "that I might be deported but that he was not
sure." Record, pg. 33. Sergio understood this representation to mean that he might be deported,
but that he might not. Such an understanding of the statement is objectively reasonable as
Galvez communicated to Sergio that he might be deported, but the attorney wasn't sure if he
would, in fact, be deported for pleading guilty to an "aggravated felony."
Like Tomas in Rojas-Martinez, Sergio was not accorded effective assistance of counsel
because Galvez failed to advise Sergio that deportation was automatic and certain. Id. at 969-70.
Sergio was charged with an offense that qualifies as an "aggravated felony" under federal
immigration law and "'because the 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act
eliminated all discretion as to deportation of non-citizens convicted of aggravated felonies,
[Defendant's] plea of guilty mean[s] virtually automatic, unavoidable deportation.'" Id. (quoting
Couto, 311 F.3d at 183-84). However, Galvez advised him that if he entered a guilty plea he
"might" be deported. Id. Because Galvez misled him about the certainty of deportation, the
collateral consequences doctrine does not bar Sergio's ineffective assistance of counsel claim
because the affirmative misadvice exception to the collateral consequences doctrine applies. Id.
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B.

The Utah Court of Appeals announced a new rule of law in Rojas-Martinez.

A case establishes a new rule whenever that case establishes a rule that was not "apparent
to all reasonable jurists" nor dictated by prior precedent. Lambrix v. Florida, 520 U.S. 518, 52728 (1997). ITie United States Supreme Court has determined that "a case announces a new rule
if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became
final." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989). To determine whether a result was dictated
by prior precedent, the court "must survey the legal landscape" as it existed on the date that the
defendant's conviction became final and "determine whether a state court considering the
defendant's claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing
precedent to conclude that the rule he seeks was required by the Constitution." Lambrix, 520
U.S. at 527. A rule is dictated by "then-existing precedent" if the rule "was apparent to all
reasonable jurists" and not subject to debate. Id. at 527-28. That is, such that a reasonable jurist
could not have reached a conclusion different from the one the new case announced. Id. In
making this determination, significant weight should be placed on whether the case "purports]
to rely upon any controlling precedent." Id. Lastly, it should be emphasized that the analysis
centers on whether the rule was dictated or compelled by prior precedent, not whether the rule
was a reasonable extension or interpretation of prior law.
Most of the dissent is devoted to making a forceful case that Espinosa was a reasonable
interpretation of prior law—perhaps even the most reasonable one. But the Teague
inquiry—which is applied to Supreme Court decisions that are, one must hope, usually
the most reasonable interpretation of prior law—requires more than that. It asks whether
Espinosa was dictated by precedent—i.e., whether no other interpretation was
reasonable.
Id. at 538 (emphasis in original).
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In Rojas-Martinez, the Utah Court of Appealsfranklyacknowledged that the issue of
whether to adopt the Affirmative Misadvice Rule to the collateral consequences doctrine was "an
issue of first impression in Utah's state courts." 2003 UT App 203, fl n.l (emphasis added).
Prior to Rojas-Martinez, in State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), the Utah
Court of Appeals had adopted the collateral consequences doctrine. Id. at 1304-05. Under the
collateral consequences doctrine, the defendant need not be advised of collateral consequences of
conviction, such as deportation, for counsel to provide effective assistance of counsel. Id. In
McFadden, the court held that under the collateral consequences doctrine "counsel's
performance is not deficient by the mere failure to apprise a noncitizen defendant that entry of a
guilty plea might subject defendant to deportation." Id.
To understand the significance of the McFadden decision, it is important to understand
what adopting the collateral consequences doctrine in Utah meant to reasonable jurists. Let us
look to a small sampling of the many cases cited by the McFadden Court for the proposition that
"deportation is a collateral consequence of the criminal process and hence failure to advise does
not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel," McFadden, 884 P.2d at 1305, namely, United
States v. George, 869 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1989); Varela v. Kaiser, 976 R2d 1357 (10th Cir.
1992); and United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1993).
In George, the Seventh Circuit stated, in a phrase subsequently repeated by a number of
state and federal courts, that
A deportation proceeding is a civil proceeding which may result from a criminal
prosecution, but is not a part of or enmeshed in the criminal proceeding. It is collateral to
the criminal prosecution. While the Sixth Amendment assures an accused of effective
assistance of counsel in 'criminal prosecutions,' this assurance does not extend to
collateral aspects of the prosecution.
869 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1989).
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In Varela, the Tenth Circuit quoted this very passage of George to support its holding
that an alien defendant need not be advised of the collateral consequences of possible deportation
prior to the entry of a guilty plea. See Varela v. Kaiser, 976 F.2d 1357, 1357 (10th Cir. 1992).
Likewise, in Banda, the Fifth Circuit stated that the courts
have uniformly held that deportation is a collateral consequence of the criminal process
and hence the failure to advise does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel....
Indeed, this conclusion squares with the Supreme Court's observation that the accused
must be "fully aware of the direct consequences' of a guilty plea."
United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 355 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 755 (1970)).
These cases stand for the proposition that under the collateral consequences doctrine, the
right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings simply does not encompass the
right to have counsel advise of the civil consequences that will result from decisions made in the
criminal proceeding. The courts find support for this distinction between civil consequences
advice and criminal consequences advice in the text of the Sixth Amendment, which only
guarantees the right of defendants to effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings. The
courts also find support in United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, which has held that Sixth
Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims cannot be brought based on counsel's
performance in proceedings in which there is no right to counsel in the first place, such as on a
discretionary appeal or a habeas corpus petition. See Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88
(1982). These cases conclude that since deportation advice relates to consequences that will flow
from civil proceedings, there is no right to effective assistance of counsel on the civil
consequences advice. As one commentator has noted, this conclusion is sensible because
[i]f collateral consequences are outside the scope of the lawyer's duties under the Sixth
Amendment, it would seem to be irrelevant whether counsel failed to advise the
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defendant or advised her incorrectly. If an issue is not covered by the Sixth Amendment,
it should not matter why an attorney's error occurred or how bad the error was.
Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 736 (2002).
To reasonable jurists, the adoption of the collateral consequences doctrine in McFadden
meant that affirmative misadvice on the deportation consequences of pleading guilty probably
did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Although there was some authority to the
contrary, and the McFadden court noted that two federal courts had recognized an affirmative
misadvice exception to the collateral consequences doctrine, the McFadden Court expressly
declined to adopt the affirmative misadvice exception. See McFadden, 884 P.2d at 1305 n.3.
With this background of precedent in mind, we surely cannot say that the decision in McFadden
"compelled" or "dictated" the result in Rojas-Martinez.
Significantly, the Rojas-Martinez Court did not "purport to rely upon any controlling
precedent" but rather candidly acknowledged that "this case involve[es] an issue of first
impression in Utah's state courts." 2003 UT App 23 at fl n.l. The Rojas-Martinez Court based
its holding exclusively on persuasive authority. To paraphrase the United States Supreme Court,
in the Third District Court proceedings the State was "devoted to making a forceful case that
[Rojas-Martinez] was a reasonable interpretation of prior law—perhaps even the most reasonable
one. But the Teague inquiry—which is applied to [Utah Court of Appeals] decisions that are,
one must hope, usually the most reasonable interpretations of prior law—requires more than that.
It asks whether [Rojas-Martinez] was dictated by precedent—i.e., whether no other interpretation
was reasonable." Lambrix v. Florida, 520 U.S. 518, 538 (1997).

39

In conclusion, the Affirmative Misadvice Rule was not dictated by precedent because the
issue of whether the Affirmative Misadvice Rule should be adopted in Utah was an issue of first
impression.
C.

The Affirmative Misadvice Rule should be applied retroactively to Sergio.

"The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a new rule announced by
the United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of Appeals after the
petitioner's conviction became final shall be governed by applicable state and federal principles
of retroactivity."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-35a-104(2). The Utah Supreme Court has developed a

three-part test to determine whether a new rule should be applied retroactively to final decisions
attacked on collateral review:
We hereby explicitly adopt the following analytic standards for determining the
retroactivity of new rules in criminal cases on collateral rather than direct review: 1) the
purpose to be served by the new rule, 2) the extent of reliance on the old rule, and 3) the
effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule.
Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81, 91 (Utah 1983). Subsequently, in the 1993 decision of Labrum
v. State, 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court revisited this three-part test,
reaffirmed it, and then proceeded to elaborate on the first part of the three-part test. A year later,
in Neel v. State, the Utah Supreme Court summarized the three-part test as follows;
In Labrum, we found it useful to break our inquiry into the purpose of the new rule (the
first prong of the Andrews test) into three questions: (i) Is the new rule essentially
prophylactic? (ii) would the retroactive application of the new rule result in windfall
benefits to offenders who suffered no constitutional deprivation? and (iii) does the new
rule protect or enhance a preexisting constitutional right rather than conferring a new one.
886 P.2d 1097,1104 (Utah 1994).
In its development and thorough analysis of this three-part test, the Utah Supreme Court
extensively relied upon federal precedent. See Andrews, 677 P.2d at 88-94. However, much of
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the federal precedent relied upon by the Court in Andrews was subsequently changed or
overruled. See Labrum v. State, 870 P.2d 902, 912 n.9 (Utah 1993). Despite this fact, the Utah
Supreme Court, in 1993, four years subsequent to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Teague v. Illinois, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), stated:
We note the inconsistent nature of federal retroactivity law and the overruling of the
United States Supreme Court decisions we cited with approval in Andrews v. Morris.
However, the continued vitality of these decisions is irrelevant to our state law analysis.
As the Harper Court recognized, state courts are free "to limit the retroactive operation of
their own interpretations of state law." Moreover, as we noted in Andrews, "We view the
federal precedent as instructive but not binding except insofar as we explicitly
incorporate them into our own law on retroactivity." We reaffirm that principle here.
Labrum v. State, 870 P.2d 902, 912 n.9 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Moreover, in two cases subsequent to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Teague, the
Utah Supreme Court has explicitly reaffirmed the three-part test, unmodified by any federal
Teague analysis. See Labrum v. State, 870 P.2d 902, 912 (Utah 1993) (reaffirming Andrews test
despite contrary federal authority); Neel v. State, 886 P.2d 1097, 1104-05 (Utah 1994)
(reaffirming Andrews test and Labrum explication of first prong of Andrews test).
Under the Andrews three-part test, the Affirmative Misadvice Rule should be
retroactively applied because: (1) the Affirmative Misadvice Rule is not prophylactic; (2) there is
minimal reliance on the McFadden rule; and (3) the retroactive application of the Affirmative
Misadvice Rule would not adversely impact the administration of justice.
First, the Affirmative Misadvice Rule is not prophylactic and its application would not
result in windfall benefits to offenders because it would only result in the withdrawal of
involuntary guilty pleas. The Court must determine what purpose is to be served by the
Affirmative Misadvice Rule. Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81,91 (Utah 1983). To make this
determination, it is useful for the court to analyze the following three questions:
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(i) Is. the new rule essentially prophylactic? (ii) would the retroactive application of the
new rule result in windfall benefits to offenders who suffered no constitutional
deprivation? and (iii) does the new rule protect or enhance a preexisting constitutional
right rather than conferring a new one.
Neel v. State, 886 P.2d 1097, 1104 (Utah 1994). The purpose served by the Affirmative
Misadvice Rule is to prevent alien defendants from being held to involuntary pleas that resulted
from the ineffective assistance of counsel. The Affirmative Misadvice Rule is not prophylactic.
The Affirmative Misadvice Rule does not impose a duty on counsel to guard against potential
involuntary pleas. Rather, the prejudice prong of Strickland assures that the Affirmative
Misadvice Rule only serves to protect those alien defendants who have already entered an
involuntary guilty plea. See Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App. at 17-11 ("In deciding a claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the test laid out in Strickland v. Washington. Under
the Strickland test, an individual has been denied effective assistance of counsel if: (1) counsel's
performance was deficient below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and
(2) counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
That is, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland (and under RojasMartinez), the alien defendant must prove that the plea would not have been entered but for the
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Therefore, the Affirmative Misadvice Rule is not
prophylactic since it was not meant to prevent error before it occurs. Rather, it was meant to
cure error that has already occurred and that has actually prejudiced the alien defendant.
Nor would retroactive application of the Affirmative Misadvice Rule result "in windfall
benefits to offenders who suffered no constitutional deprivation." Id. Because Sergio was
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, he has suffered a "constitutional deprivation." He has
been deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Therefore,
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retroactive application of the Affirmative Misadvice Rule would not result in a "windfall
benefit," but would rather be a vindication of Sergio's Sixth Amendment rights. Moreover, the
Affirmative Misadvice Rule only "protect[s] or enhance[s] a preexisting constitutional right
rather than conferring a new one." Id. Therefore, retroactive application of the Affirmative
Misadvice Rule will not result in a "pandoras' box" of claims. The Affirmative Misadvice Rule
will only result in a few cases being brought by alien defendants who entered involuntary pleas
because they were deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.
Second, there is minimal reliance on the old McFadden rule. The Court must determine
"the extent of reliance on the old rule." Andrews, 677 P.2d at 91. Sergio's counsel relied on the
McFadden rule in affirmatively misadvising Sergio of the deportation consequences of pleading
guilty to an "aggravated felony." However, this reliance was not as extensive as that deemed by
the Utah Supreme Court as extensive enough to merit only prospective application of a new rule.
In Labrum, for example, the petitioner was an inmate who was denied parole. 870 P.2d at 90305. In making the determination to deny the inmate parole, the parole board relied upon
information that was not disclosed or made available to the inmate. Id. Under prior precedent,
the inmate had no right to such information. Id. However, the Court held that due process
"requires that the inmate know what information the Board will be considering at the hearing and
that the inmate know soon enough in advance to have a reasonable opportunity to prepare
responses and rebuttal of inaccuracies." Id. at 909. In holding that this new rule was limited to
prospective application, the Court stated that "the Board has relied quite heavily, perhaps
exclusively, on the long-standing procedural standard of discretionary notice and disclosure....
To now declare invalid each parole decision held in accordance with past law would work a
fundamental injustice on the Board, the judiciary and the citizens of this state" because
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[r]etroactive application of the rule we announce today might require the Board to reopen
the original parole grant hearings of every inmate and parolee currently under the Board's
authority. This would force the Board to rehear proceedings which did not offend due
process and resulted in entirely fair and accurate parole determinations. We are
convinced that the vast majority of prior original parole determinations fall into this
category.
Mat 913.
In stark contrast to the situation in Labrum, and as noted above, to apply the Affirmative
Misadvice Rule retroactively would not result in a "fundamental injustice" as Utah courts would
only be required to revisit a very small number of cases in which alien defendants actually
suffered a constitutional deprivation. In addition, the prejudice prong of Strickland would weed
out the majority of the few cases that are, in fact, brought. Moreover, unlike the vast majority of
parole determinations that were and are accurate and fair, the vast majority of pleas that were
entered into based upon ignorance of the deportation consequences that attend the pleas are
involuntary and unfair. Retroactive application of the Affirmative Misadvice Rule would assure
that the small number of alien defendants who entered guilty pleas to "aggravated felonies"
entered such pleas voluntarily and in accordance with the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
Third, adoption of the Affirmative Misadvice Rule would not adversely impact the
administration of justice. The Court must determine "the effect on the administration of justice
of a retroactive application of the new rule." Andrews, 677 P.2d at 91. This factor also strongly
supports the retroactive application of the Affirmative Misadvice Rule. In Labrum, the court
determined that the third Andrews factor favored non-retroactivity because the reopening of
every original parole grant hearing would result in "a serious interference with the system of
criminal justice." 870 P.2d at 913. Unlike Labrum, here it has been amply demonstrated that
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there would be hardly any impact on our criminal justice system by the retroactive application of
the Affirmative Misadvice Rule. There are several reasons that support this conclusion.
Foremost, there are very few aliens who are able to bring ineffective assistance of
counsel claims for affirmative misadvice of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to
an "aggravated felony" because an alien that does plead guilty to an "aggravated felony" is
subject to automatic and mandatory deportation without any hope of discretionary relief. See
Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App. at <[7-l1 (noting that it is certain that the defendant who pleads
guilty to an "aggravated felony" is subject to automatic and unavoidable deportation).
Therefore, any alien that brings a claim based upon a conviction that was final before the
Affirmative Misadvice Rule was adopted has already been deported. There are very few aliens,
if any, who hire counsel in Utah to contest their conviction after the alien has been deported.
Moreover, as noted supra, of those deported aliens who do hire counsel to contest their
convictions, their slight numbers will be further weeded out by the prejudice prong of Strickland.
That is, only those aliens that can show that they would not have entered their guilty plea but for
the ineffective assistance of counsel will be able to bring a meritorious claim.
ffl.

THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE EXCEPTION TO THE POST-CONVICTION
REMEDIES ACT SHOULD APPLY WHERE SERGIO RAISES MERITORIOUS
CLAIMS IN HIS VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF.
Although by its terms the Post-Conviction Remedies Act provides a one-year statute of

limitations for post-conviction actions, the Utah Supreme Court has been clear that "a
petitioner's failure to comply with a statute of limitations may never be a proper ground upon
which to dismiss a habeas corpus petition...." Frausto v. State, 966 P.2d 849, 851 (Utah 1998).
Rather, a habeas corpus petition may only be dismissed if it fails to raise a meritorious claim.
See Frausto, 966 P.2d at 851 (citing Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998)).
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A petition for post-conviction relief is the modern equivalent of a writ of habeas corpus.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "post-conviction proceedings [are] a branch of habeas
corpus" and that the two form a "single constitutional remedy." Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029,
1033-34 (Utah 1989). "[T]he Post-Conviction Remedies Act replaced prior post-conviction
remedies with a statutory, 'substantive legal remedy for any person who challenges a conviction
or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies.'" Julian v.
State, 2002 UT 61,14, 52 P.3d 1168 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-102(l) (2002)).
Even if the Court should find that a petition for post-conviction relief and a writ of habeas
corpus are distinguishable, Sergio is currently incarcerated for aggravated re-entry of a
previously removed alien, see 8 U.S.C. § 1326, and will remain in prison for at least three
additional years because of his underlying state court conviction. That is, absent the state court
conviction he would only be guilty of re-entry of a previously removed alien, not aggravated reentry. The difference between the two offenses is approximately three years of incarceration
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
The Utah Supreme Court has developed the meritorious claim exception to the statute of
limitations through the "the interests of justice" exception to the one-year statute of limitations
for post-conviction actions. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107(3) ("[i]f the court finds that the
interests of justice require, a court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file within the time
limitations."). The Court has given a liberal construction and liberal application of this exception
to avoid constitutional problems:
We note that while Julian does not directly challenge the constitutionality of 78-35a-107
(the one-year statute), he argues that if the State's narrow construction regarding the
"interests of justice" exception has any merit, then that statute also unconstitutionally
limits habeas corpus actions. Under our reasoning in this case, proper consideration of
meritorious claims raised in a habeas corpus petition will always be in the interests of
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justice. It necessarily follows that no statute of limitations may be constitutionally
applied to bar a habeas petition.
Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249,254 (Utah 1998); see also Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87,116
n.4, 89 P.3d 196 ("[t]he 'interests of justice' escape valve alleviates the concern we expressed in
Currier v. Holden. In Currier, we struck down the former statute of limitations governing postconviction relief because it was 'a rigid three-month limitation' that did not include a provision
excusing delay for good cause.'") (emphasis added) (citations omitted); Provo City Corp. v.
State, 795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 1990) ("We have a duty to construe statutes to avoid
constitutional conflicts.").
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a liberal construction and application of the
"interests of justice" exception to the one-year statute of limitations means that "proper
consideration of meritorious claims raised in habeas petition[s] will always be in the interests of
justice." Frausto, 966 P.2d at 851 (citing Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998)).
"Therefore, in light of Julian, courts must always consider the 'interests of justice' exception in
section 78-35a-107 when a petitioner raises meritorious claims" and "a petitioner's failure to
comply with a statute of limitations may never be a proper ground upon which to dismiss a
habeas corpus petition...." Id. However, "no court has yet actually declared the statute of
limitations set forth in section 78-35a-107 unconstitutional," and so a court may still dismiss a
petition for post-conviction relief if the petition does not raise a meritorious claim. Swart v.
State, 1999 UT App 96,14, 976 P.2d 100. But, so long as the petition raises a meritorious claim,
it may not be dismissed under the one-year statute of limitations because "[p]roper consideration
of meritorious claims raised in a habeas corpus petition will always be in the interests of justice."
Julian, 966 P.2d at 254.
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To illuminate these principles, let us consider Frausto v. State, 966 P.2d 849 (Utah 1998).
In Frausto, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel. Id. at 850. The district court "found that the limitations period began to
run on June 28,1996, the date on which the court of appeals dismissed his appeal, and that
Frausto filed his petition on September 10,1997, more than one year later. Therefore, the
"[district] court ruled, '[by] the express terms of the statute, this fact precludes Mr. Frausto from
seeking relief in a habeas petition.'" Id. The Utah Supreme Court reversed this decision holding
that the district court erred in dismissing Frausto's petition "without considering whether the
interests of justice excused his failure to file within the one-year limitations period. Because a
petitioner's failure to comply with a statute of limitations may never be a proper ground upon
which to dismiss a habeas corpus petition, we hold that the district court erred in dismissing
Frausto's petition." Id. at 851.
In the case at bar, Sergio raises two meritorious claims: (1) that the failure of Sergio's
counsel to advise him of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an "aggravated
felony" constituted ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) that Sergio's counsel provided
ineffective assistance of counsel where Sergio's counsel affirmatively misadvised Sergio of the
deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an "aggravated felony." Therefore, it is in the
interests of justice to "excuse [the] petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations."
CODE ANN.

UTAH

§ 78-35a-107(3).
CONCLUSION

Sergio's petition for post-conviction relief should not be dismissed based upon a one-year
statute of limitations. It is in the interests of justice to adjudicate Sergio's claim for postconviction relief, filed outside of the one-year statute of limitations, because Sergio was denied
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the effective assistance of counsel under new rules of constitutional law that should be
retroactively applied to Sergio's case. Specifically, Sergio was denied the effective assistance of
counsel where: (1) Sergio was not advised of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to
an "aggravated felony"; and (2) Sergio was affirmatively misadvised of the deportation
consequences of pleading guilty to an "aggravated felony."
It is also in the interests of justice to adjudicate Sergio's claim for post-conviction relief,
filed outside of the one-year statute of limitations, where Sergio's Verified Petition for PostConviction Relief raises meritorious claims.
First, Sergio was denied the effective assistance of counsel where his attorney failed to
advise him of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an "aggravated felony." This
Court should adopt the Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule in the wake of AEDPA
and IIRIRA. AEDPA and IIRIRA have caused drastic changes to immigration law which make
the McFadden rule untenable. More importantly, policy considerations in the wake of AEDPA
and IIRIRA militate adopting the Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule. The
Significance of the Collateral Consequence Rule should be applied retroactively to Sergio as it is
not a prophylactic rule and its retroactive application would have a minimal effect on our
criminal justice system.
Second, Sergio was denied the effective assistance of counsel where his attorney
affirmatively misadvised him of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to an
"aggravated felony." In Rojas-Martinez, the Utah Court of Appeals adopted a new rule, the
Affirmative Misadvice Rule. The Affirmative Misadvice Rule was a new rule because the issue
of whether to adopt the Affirmative Misadvice Rule was an issue of first impression in Utah and
because the Affirmative Misasdivce Rule was not dictated or compelled by precedent. The
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Affirmative Misadvice Rule should be retroactively applied to Sergio because it is not a
prophylactic rule and its retroactive application would have a minimal effect on our criminal
justice system.
Third, Sergio's Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief raises meritorious claims, as
delineated infra, and thus should be adjudicated on the merits.
DATED this aft day of December, 2004
LUNDELL & LOFGREN, P.C.

ROB A. JdsiMAN

Attorney for Sergio Llamas-Rodriguez
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UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SERGIO LLAMAS-RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner,

I FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION

v.
SALT LAKE COUNTY DISTRICT
ATTORNEY,1

Case No. 040909928
Judge Anthony B. Quinn

Respondent.

This matter came before the Court on 17 September 2004 for argument on the State's motion
to dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was not present but appeared through
counsel, Rick Lundell. The State appeared through counsel, Assistant Attorney General Christopher
D. Ballard. The Court has reviewed the petition, the State's motion to dismiss, the memoranda filed
in support of and in opposition to the motion, and has also heard argument from both parties. Now

1

Petitioner mistakenly listed the Salt Lake County District Attorney as the Respondent. The
only proper respondent is the State of Utah. See Utah R. Civ. P, 65C(h) (Where a post-conviction
petition "is a challenge to a felony conviction or sentence, the respondent is the State of Utah
represented by the Attorney General."

being fully advised in the premises, the Court enters the following findings of fact, conclusions of
law and order dismissing the petition,
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Petitioner was sentenced on 14 February 2000.
2. He did not file an appeal.
3. The last day he could have filed a notice of appeal was 15 March 2000. See Utah R. App.
P. 4(a).
4. Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107(2)(c), petitioner's post-conviction cause of
action accrued 15 March 2000, and expired one year later on 15 March 2001.
5. Petitioner filed his petition for post-conviction relief on 13 May 2004.
6. Petitioner alleges that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his counsel provided
ineffective assistance that adversely affected his guilty plea when counsel advised him that if he pled
guilty he "'might be deported' but that [counsel] was not sure."
7. Petitioner contends that pursuant to section 78-35a-107(3), the "interests of justice"
exception should excuse his untimely filing because his claim is based on the court of appeals'
opinion in State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App 203, 73 P.3d 967. According to petitioner, RojasMartinez announced a new rule governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims relating to advice
about the immigration consequences of guilty pleas. Petitioner also contends that this new rule
should apply retroactively to his case.
8. Petitioner does not allege any other reason why the 'interests of justice" should excuse his
untimely filing.

i

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The petition is untimely pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107(l) (2002). The PostConviction Remedies Act's statute of limitations expired on 15 March 2001 and petitioner did not
file his petition until 13 May 2004. Therefore, petitioner can only proceed if he can satisfy the
"interests ofjustice'5 exception found in section 78-3 5a-l 07(3).
2. Petitioner fails, however, to satisfy the "interests of justice" exception.
3. Contrary to petitioner's claim, Rojas-Martinez did not announce new rule. As the court of
appeals recognized, Rojas-Martinez merely adopted "a commonly recognized exception to the rule"
that an attorney's failure to inform a client of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 2003 UT App 203 at \ 8 (emphasis added).
4. In any event, even if Rojas-Martinez did announce a new rule that should be applied
retroactively, petitioner has not alleged a violation of that rule. Counsel's advice that petitioner
"'might be deported' but that [counsel] was not sure," did not affirmatively misrepresent the
immigration consequences of petitioner's guilty plea. Therefore, counsel's advise in this case is
distinguishable from the advice given in Rojas-Martinez.
5. Whereas petitioner does not allege any other basis upon which this Court could find that
the "interests of justice" should excuse his late filing, he fails to satisfy the exception.
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court enters the
following:

3

ORDER
1. The State's motion to dismiss the petition as untimely is GRANTED.
2. The petition is DISMISSED with prejudice.
DATED /f

October 2004.
BY THE COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Rick S. Lundell
Counsel for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on 27 September 20041 mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing
proposed FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER DISMISSING
PETITION, to Rick S. Lundell, Brian K. Lofgren, LUNDELL & LOFGREN, P.C, 136 South Main,
Suite A-200, Salt Lake City, UT 84101, and further certify that as of 14 October 2004 I have
received no response.

Christopher D. Ballard
Assistant Attorney General

